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INTRODUCTION1

The adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code represents the
culmination of a decades-long effort to codify the law of Louisiana
pertaining to mineral rights, including oil and gas, as such legal rules and
precepts had been developed judicially for seven and a half decades after
bringing in the first commercial well in Louisiana.2 Until the Mineral Code
was enacted,3 the Louisiana Legislature had adopted very few statutes
addressing the needs or exigencies of this important industry.4
1. Portions of this Article are taken from PATRICK S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA
MINERAL LEASES: A TREATISE (Claitor’s Law Books & Publishing Division, Inc.
2016) [hereinafter OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE], principally by way of
adaptation, reorganization, and supplementation.
2. See Patrick S. Ottinger, From the Courts to the Code: The Origin and
Development of the Law of Louisiana on Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY LAW
& RESOURCES 5 (2012).
3. Title 31, Louisiana Revised Statutes, enacted by Act No. 50, 1974 La.
Acts Vol. III, effective January 1, 1975.
4. See, e.g., Rives v. Gulf Ref. Co., 62 So. 623, 624 (La. 1913) (“The
Legislature up to this time has been silent upon the subject of mineral rights and
contracts.”); Spence v. Lucas, 70 So. 796, 798 (La. 1916) (“Until the Legislature
shall have passed laws specially applicable to the industry of mining, which is a
new one in this state, the parties engaged in those pursuits and the courts of the
state will adhere to the jurisprudence on the subject, and treat mineral contracts as
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The oil and gas industry was launched in Louisiana at a time when the
laws of our state were quite lacking in statutory or codal rules to regulate
or manage that nascent industry. As noted by one early commentator:
The discovery of oil in Louisiana found the State with no mining
laws, as that industry was unknown in this section. The few
antiquated sections of the Codes and statutes which might apply
were evidently casual and accidental expressions and illustrations
enacted without the remotest idea that they would ever apply to
the production of oil and gas.5
For the most part, the Code constitutes a codification of the decisions of
the Louisiana Supreme Court on an array of matters involving mineral
rights.6 Indeed, the seminal legislative action that put the codification
movement into motion was a Joint Resolution of the Louisiana Legislature
adopted as Act No. 170 of 1936, in which it was determined that
appointing a Commission will be the Governor’s duty. This Commission
had the duty to draft a Code “to be known as ‘A Code of the Oil, Gas and
Mineral Laws of the State of Louisiana.’” The stated purpose of this Code
was to codify all Louisiana laws “relative to the private ownership, leasing,
selling, mortgaging of oil, gas and other minerals, or otherwise dealing
therein, and rights relating thereto or connected therewith.”7
The Louisiana Mineral Code manifests a robust respect for the policy
of “freedom of contract” and serves as a primary source of law because it
leases.”); Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336, 343 (La. 1940) (“Having declined
to enact laws for the regulation of the oil industry and, particularly, having
declined to adopt a Mineral Code, the Legislature has placed the stamp of approval
upon the system of interpretation of oil and gas contracts which this court has
followed for so many years.”); and Reagan v. Murphy, 105 So. 2d 210, 216–17
(La. 1958) (“Without legislative guidance in the main, and utilizing codal articles
devised when the existence of modern oil development was unimagined, the court
has properly taken into account the general public interest of the commonwealth
when resolving by civilian principles the competing interests of the landowners
and of the oil-producers and their financiers.”).
5. GEORGE G. DIMICK, LOUISIANA LAW OF OIL AND GAS 3–4 (1922).
6. Preface, MINERAL CODE OF 1974, 1974 La. Acts (Vol. III) xi (“The
Mineral Code is designed in large measure to supplant by way of codification the
extensive jurisprudence that developed in this area of the law. Louisiana’s existing
mineral law was a product of jurisprudential development principally by way of
analogy to the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code relating to servitudes but
including particularly also the general rules of conventional obligations and
leases.”).
7. Act No. 170, 1936 La. Acts 495.
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exclusively governs matters specifically regulated by the Code but allows
for the relevance or application of “other laws”—principally the Louisiana
Civil Code—in matters in which the Mineral Code does not address a
particular subject.8
Several articles of the Mineral Code contain a reference to obtaining—
or not obtaining—the consent of a third person.9 Where a particular action
or permission is contingent upon obtaining the consent of some other
person, the obtention of such permission from the person whose interest is
to be protected constitutes a “predicate” that must be met or satisfied in
order for the stated consequence to be achieved or realized.10 In other
words, it is necessary to establish or confirm either the existence or
absence of a certain set of operative facts—the granting or denial of
consent—for a certain codal provision to be made applicable or operative.
SCOPE OF ARTICLE
This author is unaware of any academic examination of the entirety of
the Louisiana Mineral Code as it relates to the discrete instances where the
codal text makes it necessary—or dispenses with the necessity—to obtain
the consent of a particular person for the conduct of a particular activity,
the taking of any action, or the realization or avoidance of a stated
consequence.
Although the absence of existing commentary on this topic has not
proven to be problematic, it is hoped that this examination will be helpful
to the industry as it pertains to the meaning and workings of the articles
considered herein. Certainly, in the several instances where the Mineral
Code requires consent, the parties in a mineral rights relationship need to
have a basic understanding of the rights of the person whose permission is
needed so that proper planning might be invoked.
This Introduction “sets the table” to consider the references to consent
in the context of the Mineral Code articles. In Part I of this Article, the
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 (2000) (Supp. 2019) (“The provisions of this
Code are supplementary to those of the Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable
specifically to the subject matter of mineral law. In the event of conflict between
the provisions of this Code and those of the Civil Code or other laws the
provisions of this Code shall prevail. If this Code does not expressly or impliedly
provide for a particular situation, the Civil Code or other laws are applicable.”);
see also infra note 57.
9. Ten articles contain a requirement that consent be obtained, while four
articles dispense with the need to obtain consent.
10. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2-06, relative
to the role of the “predicate.”
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provisions of the Louisiana Mineral Code that contain a reference to a
requirement to obtain someone’s consent—or a statement that consent is
unnecessary—for a certain consequence to arise or be avoided are
examined in detail. This investigation is accompanied by an explanation
of the purpose, import, or rationale for such consent, or for the
dispensation thereof. Part II takes up the notion of consent as employed in
the Mineral Code and examines the form or manifestation of consent
where required, as well as certain temporal aspects thereof. Finally, in the
Conclusion, certain observations are made based upon the review of the
pertinent articles relative to the notion of consent under the circumstances
presented therein.
I. RELEVANT CODAL ARTICLES REQUIRING OR DISPENSING WITH THE
CONSENT OF ANOTHER
Fourteen articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code contain either a
textual requirement that the consent of a certain party must be obtained by
the person seeking to act or to enjoy a described benefit, or a statement
that such permission is not required. In instances requiring a person’s
consent, the text of each article sufficiently identifies the person whose
consent is necessary, and the interest of such person is apparent.11
In some instances, the word “consent” in an article is used as a noun—
a thing or circumstance to be sought or obtained12—while in others, it
operates as a verb—the act of seeking the expressed grant of that thing or
circumstance.13 These 14 articles are reviewed primarily in the order in
11. Purely by way of illustration, the articles that regulate the relationship
between co-owners of land or of a mineral servitude require a certain level of
consent of all co-owners in an attempt to respect minority rights, but also to allow
the will of a stated majority of co-owners to undertake certain actions on or in
respect of the co-owned thing.
12. “Consent” is used as a noun in article 50 (“Consent of the party
conducting them is not required.”); article 112 (“. . . with the consent of the owner
of the executive right, . . . .”); article 146 (“. . . by their express or implied consent
. . . .”); article 147 (“. . . removed by the lessee without the consent of the lessor,
. . . .”); articles 164, 166, and 175 (“. . . without the consent of co-owners . . . .”);
articles 165 and 170 (“. . . The consent of the co-owner of the party . . . .”); articles
17 and 177 (“. . . without the consent of his co-owner.”); article 190(B) (“ . . .
without the consent of the naked owner.”); and article 195 (“ . . . without first
obtaining the consent of the usufructuary.”) (emphasis added).
13. “Consent” is used as a verb in article 85(5) (“. . . unless the royalty owner
is a party to the act or otherwise consents expressly and in writing to become
bound by it.”) and articles 164, 166, and 175 (“. . . co-owner of the servitude who
does not consent . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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which they appear in the Mineral Code (subject to a grouping for a logical
discussion of similar provisions) and are examined in detail in an attempt
to discern the nature, purpose, and role of “consent” in each article in
which consent is required or is rendered unnecessary.
A. Article 5014
In a departure from prior jurisprudence,15 a series of articles in the
Mineral Code permit a servitude owner to “adopt” the operations of
another person to benefit from such use as a mode of interrupting
prescription.16
The first occasion to address the notion of consent is set forth in
Mineral Code article 50, which establishes an exception to the
fundamental proposition, announced in article 42, that “use of a mineral
servitude must be by the owner of the servitude, his representative or
employee, or some other person acting on his behalf.”17 Article 50 reads
as follows:
Art. 50. Adoption a matter of right
The servitude owner may adopt the operations of another as a
matter of right. Consent of the party conducting them is not
required.18
As used in this article, the term “operations” “relates . . . to the physical
activity associated with the attempt to discover or maintain production.”19
Adoption of operations means that the servitude owner manifests an
intention to benefit by the interruptive effect of the operations conducted
14. See PATRICK S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE,
Chapter 4, Mineral Servitudes § 412 (Martin, ed., Claitor’s Law Books &
Publishing Division, Inc. 2012) [hereinafter OTTINGER, MINERAL LAW
TREATISE].
15. The comment to article 53 of the Mineral Code states that its purpose is
to negate the rule of Nelson v. Young, 234 So. 2d 54 (La. 1970). In that case, while
not stated to be based on any notion of consent, the Court found that the owner of
a mineral servitude “acquiesced” by its silence to the landowner’s granting of a
mineral lease under which operations were conducted and that a quasi-contract
arose such that prescription was interrupted. Id. at 62.
16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:44–53 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
17. Id. § 31:42. Article 43 enumerates the types of persons who are deemed
to be acting on behalf of the servitude owner. Id. § 31:43.
18. Id. § 31:50.
19. Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 247 So. 2d 548, 555 (La. 1971).
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by another person not within the contemplation of articles 42 and 43, with
certain consequences resulting therefrom.20
The reason that the Code dispenses with the need to seek or obtain the
consent of the operating party is explained in the comment to article 50:
The motive for Article 50 is to make the opportunity to adopt
operations of another a reality. If this Article were not adopted, it
might be possible for a party drilling a well or opening a mine to
attempt to deny the servitude owner the right to adopt the
operations or at least to delay his adoption and possibly promote
the extinction of the servitude. The servitude owner should not be
made vulnerable to such possible conduct.21
The party who undertakes the “operations” on lands burdened by a
servitude that is not subject to a mineral lease has made a decision to
expend its capital and to solely assume the cost, risk, and expense of the
operation. Because the actor undertakes the actions either in disregard—
or without consideration—of the rights of the servitude owner, the actor
should not have the power or ability to deny the servitude owner the right
to adopt such operations to the extent that they constitute a “use” of the
servitude for the purpose of interrupting prescription accruing against this
real right.22
Additionally, because the servitude owner who adopts the operations
of another thereby commits itself “to pay his proportionate share of the
reasonable, actual costs of development and operation of the well,”23 any
requirement that the servitude owner must first seek the consent of the
drilling party would create an opportunity for the latter to “run out the
clock” by withholding its consent until the resolution of any dispute or
disagreement—legitimate or pretextual—over well costs for which the
adopting servitude owner is personally responsible. The drilling party
20. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:48–49 (pertinent to the responsibility for
costs assumed by the servitude owner who adopts the operations conducted by
another).
21. Id. § 31:50 cmt.
22. It should be noted that “[w]hen drilling or mining operations or actual
production otherwise sufficient to interrupt prescription takes place on a
compulsory unit including all or a part of the land burdened by a mineral
servitude, an interruption of prescription takes place without formal adoption by
the owner of the servitude.” Id. § 31:47.
23. Id. § 31:48. An exception to this requirement exists under article 47 in the
case of “drilling . . . operations or actual production otherwise sufficient to
interrupt prescription [that] takes place on a compulsory unit including all or a
part of the land burdened by a mineral servitude.” Id. § 31:47.
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undertook the operation at its own cost and expense, and to require the
servitude owner to get permission of the drilling party to pay it money
would create an illogical opportunity for mischief, a proposition rejected
by the redactors in dispensing with the need to secure the drilling party’s
consent.
B. Article 8524
A mineral royalty is one of the three “basic” mineral rights that might
be created by a landowner.25 The Mineral Code perpetuates the
jurisprudence that acknowledges that a mineral royalty is a passive right
entitling its owner to share in production brought about by the actions of
another.26 The Mineral Code embraces the salient aspects of the Louisiana
Supreme Court decision that recognized the prescriptible nature of a
mineral royalty, Vincent v. Bullock.27
A mineral royalty, by nature, is inferior to a mineral servitude.28 The
former right is purely passive because the holder of a mineral royalty must
await the actions of another and, importantly, the expenditure of money
by that other; the latter mineral right actually authorizes its holder to go
onto a tract of land and conduct drilling operations in an attempt to
discover and produce minerals. Because the mineral royalty is inferior to
the mineral servitude and is often dependent upon the existence of the
servitude for its own duration,29 the servitude owner has opportunities for
mischief by taking actions that invoke the law of confusion to extinguish
the inferior right of royalty.
Article 85 of the Mineral Code enumerates the bases on which a
mineral royalty will extinguish. Of particular relevance to our present
24. See OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE, supra note 14, § 510(2).
25. “The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31:16.
26. Id. § 31:81.
27. Vincent v. Bullock, 187 So. 35 (La. 1939). See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:85(1).
28. Horton v. Mobley, 578 So. 2d 977, 983 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (citing
Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 41 So. 2d 73 (La. 1949)) (“A mineral royalty is
not a servitude, but a passive, non-cost bearing interest and an inferior and
conditional real right which entitles the owner only to participate and share in the
gross production of minerals from another’s land or from land subject to a mineral
servitude owned by another and burdened with such interest when and if
production is obtained.”). Indeed, although a mineral servitude owner can create
a mineral royalty, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:82, the converse is not true.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:83.
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consideration is subsection 5, which recognizes an important exception to
the occurrence of confusion.30 It provides:
Art. 85. Extinction of mineral royalties
A mineral royalty is extinguished by:
***
(5) extinction of the right of him who established the mineral
royalty, except that the extinction of a mineral servitude by
inheritance or by any act of the servitude owner does not
extinguish a royalty burdening the servitude unless the royalty
owner is a party to the act or otherwise consents expressly and in
writing to become bound by it.31
Although each of the discrete circumstances listed in article 85 is both
logical and consistent with the corresponding article relative to the mineral
servitude,32 article 85(5) merits particular commentary.
The exception provided in article 85(5) is designed to ensure that the
holder of a royalty interest is not divested of its rights by certain actions
over which the holder has no control. In particular, it assuages concerns
that the mineral servitude owner might engage in a nefarious scheme in an
attempt to purge the royalty owner of its rights, passive and inferior as they
might be.
The comment to article 85 cautions that “[s]ome care should be taken
in the reading and application of paragraph 5 of article 85.”33 The comment
notes that the rule only applies if the mineral royalty is carved out of a
mineral servitude and, hence, is dependent upon the continuation of the
latter for its existence. Thus, as further explained in the comments to
article 85:
The exceptions in paragraph 5 are necessary to prohibit potential
injustice arising from honest or conspiratorial acts of a party or by
operation of law. For example, the owner of a mineral servitude
who has created a mineral royalty should not be permitted by
collusive action, or by arms’ length dealing, to extinguish the
30. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 765 (2018) (“A predial servitude is extinguished
when the dominant and the servient estates are acquired in their entirety by the
same person.”).
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:85(5).
32. Id. § 31:27.
33. Id. § 31:85 cmt.
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royalty by a renunciation or remission of his servitude in favor of
the landowner. Insertion of the exception in this regard does not
inhibit the servitude owner from dealing with his interest as may
be of greatest benefit to himself, but it protects the royalty owner
appropriately. The other exception contemplates the possibility
that a party may, for example, create a mineral servitude in favor
of a child, who may in turn create a royalty. Death of the parent
with resultant acquisition of the land by the child would extinguish
the servitude by confusion. The royalty created by the child,
however, should not be extinguished by operation of law in these
circumstances.34
Thus, article 85(5) articulates that an “act of the servitude owner” that
would otherwise result in the “extinction of a mineral servitude” will not
have that effect “unless the royalty owner is a party to the act or otherwise
consents expressly and in writing to become bound by it.”35
An example that comes to mind is the execution by the mineral
servitude owner of an instrument that renounces the servitude.36 Although
that would ordinarily bring the servitude to an end and, concomitantly,
result in the extinction of the mineral royalty burdening the servitude, this
result would not occur “unless the royalty owner is a party to the act or
otherwise consents expressly and in writing to become bound by it.” Any
other rule would facilitate chicanery by permitting the grantor of the
royalty interest to cause its premature termination with impunity. Such an
action would be repugnant to notions of good faith owed by a contracting
party37 and a grantor’s warranty of eviction.38
It should be reiterated that this exception is “applicable only if the
royalty is carved out of a servitude interest and is not applicable when a
servitude interest is merely burdened with a royalty that is not dependent
on the servitude in terms of prescriptive life.”39 The Redactors of the
Mineral Code were thoughtful and prudent in addressing the possibility
34. Id.
35. Id. § 31:85(5).
36. Id. § 31:27(3). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 771 (2018) (“A predial servitude is
extinguished by an express and written renunciation by the owner of the dominant
estate.”).
37. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759 (“Good faith shall govern the conduct of the
obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.”).
38. Cf. id. art. 2512 (“The warranty against eviction extends also to those
things that proceed from the thing sold.”).
39. See L. Linton Morgan, The Impact of Louisiana Mineral Code on Mineral
Servitudes and Mineral Royalties, 22 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1, 19 n.54 (1975).
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that a party would use certain means to effectively “wash-out” the valuable
rights of a mineral royalty owner.
C. Article 11240
The Louisiana Mineral Code also governs executive rights, and the
owner of these rights must give consent before drilling operations may be
conducted by the owner of the land or mineral servitude if undertaken
other than pursuant to a mineral lease granted by the executive right owner.
An executive right is defined in article 105 of the Mineral Code as “the
exclusive right to grant mineral leases of specified land or mineral
rights.”41 Being an “exclusive” right, no other person should have the
ability either to grant a mineral lease on the “specified land or mineral
rights” or to operate in its own right, as to do so would render meaningless
the exclusivity of this mineral right.42 An exception is recognized by article
112 of the Code as follows:
Art. 112. Right of nonexecutive to operate
When the executive right is separated from a mineral servitude or
ownership of the land, the land or servitude owner has the right,
with the consent of the owner of the executive right, to conduct
drilling or mining operations on the land.43
In recognition of the fact that an executive right is the “exclusive right to
grant mineral leases of specified land or mineral rights,”44 the Mineral
Code expressly states that the consent of the owner of the executive right
is necessary in order for the owner of the land or of a mineral servitude to
conduct drilling operations on the land in question.
Were the consent of the owner of the executive right not required
under these circumstances, it would render the executive right somewhat
illusory because the right to grant a mineral lease would be diminished if
the owner of the land undertook, for his own account, the conduct of
drilling operations. Certainly, the lessee under a mineral lease granted by
the holder of an executive right would have something to say if the owner
of the land or mineral servitude could operate with impunity on the leased
40. Portions of the commentary on article 112 represent an adaptation of
materials contained in § 7-14 of OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1.
41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:105.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 31:112.
44. Id. § 31:105.
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land in total disregard of the valid rights of the mineral lessee. The
mechanism of consent guards against this contingency.
D. Article 14645
In the nascent stages of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana, courts
were called upon to elucidate with respect to the legal nature of contracts
for the exploration for oil, gas, or other minerals. In an early case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that “mineral leases will be construed as
leases, and not sales, and that the law with reference to leases will be
applied thereto in so far as they may be.”46 The judicial pronouncement
led to numerous cases that presented the issue of the applicability to the
mineral leases of legal features of a lease.
As early as 1940, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that “the
mineral lessor is entitled to a lien, privilege and right of pledge upon the
property placed on the leased premises by the lessee.”47 Hence, just as in
the case of a lessor of a non-mineral lease governed by the Civil Code, a
lessor under a mineral lease has a right of pledge to seize the lessee’s
property to enforce certain obligations of the lessee, principally the duty
to pay royalty.48
Mineral Code article 146 continues this security device, as follows:
Art. 146. Lessor’s privilege
The lessor of a mineral lease has, for the payment of his rent, and
other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on all equipment,
machinery, and other property of the lessee on or attached to the
property leased. The right also extends to property of others on or
attached to the property leased by their express or implied consent
in connection with or contemplation of operations on the lease or
land unitized therewith.49

45. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 12-15.
46. Spence v. Lucas, 70 So. 796, 798 (La. 1915).
47. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336, 342 (La. 1940).
48. “[R]oyalties paid to the lessor on production are rent. A mineral lessee is
obligated to make timely payment of rent according to the terms of the contract
or the custom of the mining industry in question if the contract is silent.” LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31:123; see also Patrick S. Ottinger, Calculating the Lessor’s
Royalty Payment: Much More than Mere Math, 6 LSU J. ENERGY LAW &
RESOURCES 1 (2018).
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:146.
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The context in which consent is a feature of this article pertains to
“property of others on or attached to the property leased.” If a third party
grants consent—either expressly or implicitly—that its property might be
used on the leased premises, that property is subject to the risk that the
lessor’s privilege will attach to the movable property, provided that such
property is envisioned to be used “in connection with or contemplation of
operations on the lease or land unitized therewith.” By consenting to the
use of its property in this manner, the third person assumes the risk that
the lessee will not pay royalties due to its lessor, thus giving rise to the
possibility that the lessor will seize the third party’s property as collateral
security for money owed by the lessee.
The security afforded by article 146 of the Mineral Code can be of
great comfort to a mineral lessor whose lessee has failed to comply with
its obligations under the mineral lease. The article strikes a balance
between the lessor and a third person whose property has been used on the
leased land.
E. Article 14750
As a corollary to the foregoing, in a proper case, movable property
made subject to the lessor’s privilege remains so encumbered and is thus
subject to seizure by the lessor even if it is removed from the leased
premises without the consent of the lessor. That is, the burdened property
may be pursued off of the leased premises, provided it is seized “within
fifteen days after it has been removed by the lessee without the consent of
the lessor.”51
On the other hand, if the lessor consents to the removal of the property,
it has necessarily excluded the property from the reach of the privilege that
might otherwise apply. These principles are acknowledged in article 147
of the Mineral Code, reading, as follows:
Art. 147. Right to seize property on premises or within fifteen days
of removal
The mineral lessor may seize the property subject to his privilege
before the lessee removes it from the leased premises, or within
fifteen days after it has been removed by the lessee without the
consent of the lessor, if it continues to be the property of the lessee,

50. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 12-15.
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:147.
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and can be identified.52
In Vaught v. Ratliff, 53 a case admittedly not concerned with the notion
of consent, a lessor sought to seize certain movable property located on
the leased premises to secure its claim for unpaid royalties. Asserting that
he was the owner of the seized equipment, a third party owning no interest
in the mineral lease intervened in the suit to seek the release of his property
from the sequestration. The court stated that “[t]he issue presented here is
whether there exists any remedy at law for the intervenor to recover his
property seized to secure a lessor’s privilege in the context of a mineral
lease to which he was not a party.”54
After reviewing the applicable provisions of the Louisiana Mineral
Code— particularly including articles 146, 147, and 14855—the Louisiana
Civil Code, and the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the court
concluded that “there is an absence of express law in the Mineral Code
governing this particular situation.”56 The court then declined to resort to
statutory provisions not contained in the Mineral Code,57 saying, as
follows:
52. Id.
53. Vaught v. Ratliff, 509 So. 2d 647 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 648.
55. Article 148 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides: “The mineral lessor
may enforce his right of pledge in the same manner as the right of pledge accorded
other lessors.”
56. Vaught, 509 So. 2d at 650.
57. The court’s declination to invoke and apply the procedural aspects of the
Code of Civil Procedure seems insupportable in view of Mineral Code article 2
and of the actual language of article 148, supra note 55, which expressly states
that the right of pledge contained in article 146 may be enforced “in the same
manner as the right of pledge accorded other lessors.” This textual referral to other
relevant laws, without more, should have been ample authority for the court to
invoke those laws. More contemporary decisions of the courts have properly
recognized that resort to “other laws” is justified and appropriate only if the matter
under consideration is not addressed by the Mineral Code. See, e.g., Regions Bank
v. Questar Expl. & Prod. Corp., 184 So. 3d 260, 265–66 (La Ct. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 206 So. 3d 882 (La. 2016) (“The general lease provision, article 2679
of the Civil Code enacted in 2005, and which provides that a maximum lease term
is 99 years, cannot apply to mineral leases because mineral leases have their own
maximum term as provided by the Mineral Code.”) and Gloria’s Ranch v. Tauren
Expl., Inc., 252 So. 3d 431, 438 (La. 2018) (“First, on a legal basis, we find no
authority for superseding the ownership principles set forth in the La. Mineral
Code with those of the La. Civil Code.”). In the interest of full disclosure, your
author represented certain amici curiae in the Gloria’s Ranch case.
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The absence of express statutory provisions in the Mineral Code
for the protection of third parties tempts us to essay a judicial
emendation under authority of LSA–C.C. art. 21, but the
comparatively recent redaction and adoption of the Mineral Code
suggests that the matter is more appropriate for legislative
consideration.58
Although the court found it inappropriate to apply former article 2707 of
the Louisiana Civil Code—which, at that time, provided a remedy for third
persons affected by a seizure by a lessor—it nevertheless gave relief to the
intervenor by finding that the seized property was exempt from seizure.59
The court ultimately held that, “Based upon this finding and the requisite
proof of ownership presented in the court below, the writ of sequestration
should be ordered dissolved as to that property shown in the trial court to
belong to the intervenor herein.”60
Article 147 strikes a balance between the security rights of the lessor
by allowing pursuit of the encumbered property within a reasonable period
of time after it is removed from the leased premises.
F. Consent Among Owners in Indivision—Articles 164, 166, and 17561
1. Introduction
Three articles of the Louisiana Mineral Code address the
circumstances under which operations may be conducted on co-owned
land or mineral servitude without the necessity to secure the unanimous
consent of all co-owners, and intervening articles involving the notion of
consent will be examined thereafter. As will be seen, the articles, while
addressing different factual circumstances, are quite similar in content and
import and share in common two features of consent, namely:
(1) identifying the threshold of consent that must be obtained in order to
operate on the land in question; and (2) recognizing that costs of
58. Vaught, 509 So. 2d at 650.
59. Id. at 650–51.
60. Id. at 651.
61. Portions of the commentary on articles 164, 166, and 175 represent an
adaptation of materials contained in Patrick S. Ottinger, Oil in the Family—
Obtaining the Requisite Consent to Conduct Operations on Co-Owned Land or
Mineral Servitudes, 73 LA. L. REV. 745 (2013) [hereinafter Ottinger, Oil in the
Family]; see also C. ESTON SINGLETARY, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE,
Chapter 12, Co-ownership and Partition § 1211 (Martin, ed., Claitor’s Law
Books & Publishing Division, Inc. 2012) [hereinafter SINGLETARY, MINERAL
LAW TREATISE].
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development and operations cannot be assessed against a party whose
consent was not obtained. These common features will be considered
hereafter.
In the interest of clarity, article 164, 166, and 175 are examined as a
group, with differences being noted as necessary. The first of such articles
addresses the creation of mineral servitude by a co-owner of land.
2. Article 164
Article 164 of the Louisiana Mineral Code pertains to the
circumstances under which the owner of a mineral servitude acquired from
less than all of the owners of the land may conduct operations. More
typically, it is the lessee of such a mineral servitude who will undertake
the conduct of operations, but such lessee acquires no greater rights than
its lessor,62 so the same threshold of consent must be obtained in order to
do so. Article 164 reads:
Art. 164. Creation of mineral servitude by co-owner of land
A co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of his
undivided interest in the land, and prescription commences from
the date of its creation. One who acquires a mineral servitude from
a co-owner of land may not exercise his right without the consent
of co-owners owning at least an undivided seventy-five percent
interest in the land, provided that he has made every effort to
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract
with them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted
with another co-owner. A co-owner of the land who does not
consent to the exercise of such rights has no liability for the costs
of development and operations, except out of his share of
production.63
As noted above, article 164 is the first of the trilogy of articles that impose
a requirement that the consent of a certain threshold of owners be obtained
and that, with respect to all co-owners who have not granted their consent,
an effort be made to contract with such non-consenting co-owners. Article
164 creates a template for the treatment of matters addressed in two other
contexts, being articles 166 and 175.
62. Case law and logic embrace the proposition that a party cannot grant,
lease, or convey any greater rights than it holds or owns. See OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2-09.
63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
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3. Article 16664
In contrast to the situation in which a passive right of mineral royalty
is created by a co-owner of a superior interest (a matter regulated by article
165 of the Mineral Code), the creation of a mineral lease by a co-owner of
land presents a significantly different set of considerations. These
circumstances are regulated by article 166 of the Mineral Code:
Art. 166. Granting of mineral lease by co-owner of land
A co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease or a valid lease
or permit for geological surveys, by means of a torsion balance,
seismographic explosions, mechanical device, or any other
method as to his undivided interest in the land but the lessee or
permittee may not exercise his rights thereunder without consent
of co-owners owning at least an undivided seventy-five percent
interest in the land,65 provided that he has made every effort to
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract
with them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted
with another co-owner. A co-owner of the land who does not
consent to the exercise of such rights has no liability for the costs
of development and operations or other costs, except out of his
share of production.66
A co-owner of land can grant a mineral lease as to his interest, and it is a
valid lease,67 but operations cannot be undertaken on the co-owned land
unless the strictures of the article are satisfied, which are matters addressed
herein.68
64. Portions of the commentary on article 166 represent an adaptation of
materials contained in Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, as well as of
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 3-42.
65. See infra Section I.F.5.a.
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166. Inexplicably, the last sentence of article
166 differs slightly from the other two articles of our trilogy in that it makes
reference to the non-liability of a non-consenting party “for the costs of
development and operations and other costs.” “Assuming that it was intentional
(and even meaningful), it is unapparent why this article (addressing the granting
of a mineral lease by a co-owner of land) would justify this different formulation.”
Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 785.
67. See infra Section I.F.5.c
68. As a historical matter, the right of a co-owner of land to operate on the
co-owned property was considered in a significant Louisiana Supreme Court
decision, Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La. 1919), and
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4. Article 17569
Similar to the instance where, as under article 166, a co-owner of land
may grant a valid mineral lease, a co-owner of a mineral servitude must
obtain consent of a requisite percentage of co-owners before it can exercise
its rights to operate on the land burdened by the co-owned mineral
servitude. This proposition is regulated by Mineral Code article 175.
As with the two articles previously considered, articles 164 and 166,
and except as hereinafter provided, no exploration and production (E&P)
operations may be conducted on land burdened by a distinct mineral
servitude that is owned in indivision unless the requisite level of consent
of co-owners of such servitude is obtained. There is an important
difference, however, in the manner in which the level of consent is
calculated.70 Article 175 reads:
Art. 175. Co-owner of mineral servitude may not operate
independently
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on
the property subject to the servitude without the consent of coowners owning at least an undivided seventy-five percent interest
in the servitude,71 provided that he has made every effort to
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract
with them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted
with another co-owner. . . . A co-owner of the servitude who does
not consent to such operations has no liability for the costs of
development and operations except out of his share of
production.72

was expounded upon in later decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
North Central Texas Oil Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co. of La., 105 So. 411 (La. 1925);
United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 147 So. 66 (La.
1933); and Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 196 So. 558 (La. 1940).
69. See SINGLETARY, MINERAL LAW TREATISE, supra note 61, § 1211.
70. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, Part IX at 78–82.
71. See infra Section I.F.5.a.
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
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5. Commentary on Common Features of Articles 164, 166, and 175
a. Consent Threshold
Each article authorizes the conduct of operations on the subject land
or servitude only if the party proposing to conduct operations has secured
a stated level of consent among relevant co-owners. When the Mineral
Code was adopted, the consent of all co-owners was required for the
conduct of operations. This was consistent with applicable law pertaining
to co-ownership. However, in 1986, the Louisiana Legislature reduced the
level of consent needed in order to operate to 90%, and it later reduced it
to 80% in 1988.73 With the adoption of Act No. 350 of the 2019 Regular
Session of the Louisiana Legislature, effective August 1, 2019, the
requisite level of consent was reduced to 75%.
b. Codal Proviso
Pursuant to Mineral Code article 164, the owner of a mineral servitude
created by fewer than all of the co-owners of land must secure “the consent
of co-owners owning at least an undivided seventy-five percent interest in
the land” in order to operate on such land.74 Similarly, under Mineral Code
article 166, one who acquires a mineral lease from a co-owner of land may
not exercise such right without the consent of co-owners of the land
owning at least an undivided 75% interest “in the land.”75 Because one
may not transfer greater rights than he has,76 a lessee of a co-owner may
not operate on the co-owned land unless and until the requisite consent is
obtained.
Assuming that the requisite consent is obtained, the party desiring to
operate still must demonstrate that he has made “every effort” to contact
such yet-to-have-consented co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to
contract with them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted
with another co-owner. In other words, it is “consent plus.”
As is often the case, the legislation raises many questions. For
example, noting that article 166 requires that “every effort” be made to
contact the other co-owners and that the adjective “reasonable” does not
modify those words, it is uncertain as to what effort “to contact” will be
73. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, Part III at 761–64.
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
75. Id. at § 31:166.
76. For authority supporting the proposition that a party cannot grant, lease,
or convey any greater rights than it holds or owns, see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE
TREATISE, supra note 1, § 2-09.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 315

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1304

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

deemed to be sufficient or, more importantly, will be deemed to fall short
of constituting “every effort.”
Is the phrase, “every effort,” intended to be read literally, or does it
mean “every reasonable effort”? If a lessee cannot locate an owner using
conventional methods, does the lessee have to advertise in a newspaper in
an attempt to ascertain the absentee’s whereabouts? What effort will be
deemed to fail to constitute the making of “every effort” to contact these
parties, with the result that operations cannot be lawfully conducted?
In the absence of unanimous consent, how does a title examiner issue
an opinion that the unsuccessful efforts “to contact” the yet-to-haveconsented co-owners are nevertheless sufficient to constitute “every
effort” and, thus, that the proviso of article 166 has been satisfied such that
E&P operations can be lawfully conducted, even without the consent of
the parties who have not been contacted?77
Let’s complicate this proposition. Those yet-to-have-consented
co-owners who are contacted must be “offered [the opportunity] to
contract . . . on substantially the same basis that [the party desiring to
operate] has contracted with another co-owner.”78 Questions are presented
by this requirement, including the following: Does the proviso essentially
impose a statutory “Most Favored Nations Clause”? To whose “other
contract,” or “basis [of terms],” is this to be compared? What, for these
purposes, does “another co-owner” mean?
What if the lessee has reached five different deals with five distinct
co-owners—different bonus, rental, royalty, primary term, “Pugh Clause”
term, other specific provisions, et cetera? What does “substantially the
same basis” mean? Does the operator discharge its duty under the proviso
by merely offering “to contract,” but only on the terms most favorable to
it? Can the co-owner so contacted insist that it be offered the opportunity
to contract on the terms that are most favorable to it, failing which, the
proviso has not been met?
Is the implication that, unless the lessee has tried to contact and
contract with all co-owners, his operations under lease or leases from, say,
95% of the co-owners could be opposed by the non-contracting parties?
What standard of proof will be required to demonstrate that the lessee has
complied with the proviso or that he has made “every effort” to do so?
Should all offers to lease be in writing?
In view of these unanswered issues, it is appropriate to again wonder
how a title examiner can approve title for drilling purposes under these
circumstances.
77. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1-26(b).
78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 31:166, 31:175.
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c. Worth of a Mineral Right to Which Consent to Operate Not
Granted
One final observation is appropriate with respect to the consequences
arising out of a failure or inability to obtain the requisite consent in the
circumstances addressed by two of the three articles considered thus far—
articles 164 and 166.79 Despite the language in the early cases that a
mineral lease granted by one co-owner is “null in so far as the co-owner is
concerned,”80 the lease is still valid between the lessor and the lessee.81
Actually, this is not merely a matter of conjecture or inference but is
explicitly recognized in the text of article 166, which states that a
“co-owner of land may grant a valid mineral lease . . . as to his undivided
interest in the land but the lessee . . . may not exercise his rights thereunder
without consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided seventy-five
percent interest in the land.”82
A similar observation is drawn from article 164, under which, by
stating that a “co-owner of land may create a mineral servitude out of his
undivided interest in the land” and that “prescription commences from the
date of its creation,”83 one must conclude that the servitude is valid and
effective—inasmuch as prescription has begun to accrue—but simply
cannot be used unless and until the requisite consent is acquired and the
codal proviso is met.
Hence, the failure or inability to obtain the requisite consent does not
render the mineral right invalid or without any value whatsoever. Rather,
it simply means that no operations may be conducted on the surface of the
land pursuant to that mineral right.
If the mineral servitude owner cannot operate on the land because the
owner is unable to obtain the requisite consent as either article 164 or 175
requires, or if the owner of a mineral lease cannot operate on the land
because the owner is unable to obtain the requisite consent as article 166
envisions, is there any value to the mineral right which it holds? Yes. Even
though the owner of such a mineral right is not able to conduct drilling
operations on the surface of the land due to the absence of the needed
consent, it is still a valid mineral servitude or mineral lease. Thus, if the
land in question is unitized with a well drilled on another tract in the unit,
then the mineral right is valid and the owner thereof is entitled to
79. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, Part XIII.
80. Gulf Ref. Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 279 (La. 1919).
81. “By all this is not meant that the lease is not valid as between the lessor
and the lessee, . . .” Id.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (emphasis added).
83. Id. § 31:164.
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participate in production to the extent provided by law. Clearly,
participation in a producing unit where the unit well is situated on another
tract does not violate the prohibition of the conduction of operations on
the co-owned tract of land.
On balance, one concludes that a mineral lease may be validly
granted—and, thus, may represent a valuable asset to its holder, such as
by being included in a unit in which operations are lawfully undertaken on
another unitized tract—and that such conclusion is not diminished by the
fact that the lessee under a mineral lease to which operational consent of
the requisite number of owners may not have been obtained.
d. Limited Responsibility of Non-Consenting Co-Owner for Costs
We next examine the notion that, without having granted consent for
the conduct of operations, a co-owner is not personally responsible for
costs incurred by the party who conducts such operations.84 Articles 164,
166, and 175 all contain a sentence invoking the established principle that
a party not granting consent “has no liability for the costs of development
and operations, except out of his share of production.”85 This statement is
in recognition of the well-established tenet of Louisiana law, based upon
principles of equity, including unjust enrichment, that the operator has a
paramount right to be reimbursed for the share of costs allocable to a nonconsenting owner before the latter may receive revenue from the well.86
Hunter Co., Inc. v. McHugh87 is a case in which the constitutionality
of the Conservation Act was challenged. In that case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff’s contention that the Conservation
Act88 was invalid because, among other things, it made “no provision . . .
for collecting or enforcing” the operator’s right of reimbursement of
drilling costs.89 The Supreme Court rejected this contention by noting that:
The answer to this [contention] of course is that the [operator] has
84. The other aspect of consent is discussed in the commentary pertinent to
article 166, changing only in particulars relative to the specific context involved
in each of the three codal provisions.
85. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 31:166, 31:175.
86. See Patrick S. Ottinger, After the Lessee Walks Away—The Rights and
Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a Producing Unit, 55 ANN. INST.
ON MIN. L. 59 (2008).
87. 11 So. 2d 495 (La. 1943).
88. Act No. 157, 1940 Acts 610 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:1, et
seq.).
89. 11 So. 2d at 509.
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had and will have possession of all of the proceeds from the
production of the well and may retain all of the proceeds until the
drilling of the well and putting it on production is entirely paid
for.90
The jurisprudence is replete with cases in which this proposition is
developed.
In Huckabay v. The Texas Co.,91 the defendant drilled a well pursuant
to a mineral lease granted by the owners of a mineral servitude in and to
an undivided seven-eighths interest in the lands. The plaintiffs owned the
lands and the rights to the remaining one-eighth interest in the minerals.
Plaintiffs asserted that the defendant “was in bad faith in entering on the
land and drilling the well.”92 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that they were
“entitled to participate, according to their ownership, in the production
without being responsible for their share of the expenses.”93
The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that:
[O]n several occasions this Court has applied the equitable rule
that where one co-owner (or co-lessee) has explored and
developed a field without the concurrence or assistance of the
other, the former is bound to account to that other for his
proportionate share of the proceeds less a proportionate share of
the expenses.94
Additionally, in Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. v. Weber,95 the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal relied on Huckabay for the proposition
that, “while the right of an owner to refrain from exercising his right of
ownership is absolute, he is nevertheless, precluded from enjoyment of
profits without participation in the expenses incurred in the production of
such profits.”96
Furthermore, in General Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co.,97 the First
Circuit Court of Appeal noted that, while a non-consenting party has rights
of ownership with respect to a share of production obtained by the efforts
90. Id.
91. 78 So. 2d 829 (La. 1955).
92. Id. at 830.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 831.
95. 149 So. 2d 101 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ denied, 151 So. 2d 493
(La. 1963).
96. Id. at 108.
97. 230 So. 2d 906 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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of others, there is a “correlative obligation [on the part of the nonconsenting owner] for a like percentage of drilling and operating costs.”98
In Willis v. International Oil and Gas Corp.,99 the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed the Louisiana jurisprudence on the right
of the operator to be reimbursed out of production and concluded:
In summary, whether one is a co-owner who has not concurred or
assisted in the exploration and development of the property, or is
the owner of a separately owned tract of land embraced within a
drilling unit and has elected not to participate in the risk and
expense of the unit well, there is no entitlement to share in the
proceeds from production until the cost of drilling and operating
the well is paid for.100
Moreover, in Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Corp.,101 the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted:
A non-operating owner of a mineral interest, who does not consent
to operations within a compulsory drilling unit by an operating
owner, has no liability for the costs of development and operations
except out of his share of production.102
This body of jurisprudence finds conceptual support in the provisions
of the Civil Code103 and is encapsulated in the last sentence of the trilogy
of articles, reading essentially—but not in every instance precisely—as
follows:
A co-owner of the land who does not consent to the exercise of
such rights has no liability for the costs of development and
operations or other costs, except out of his share of production.104
In summary, an operator who has met the applicable consent threshold
necessary to conduct operations may do so, notwithstanding the fact that
it has not secured the consent of all co-owners, but is relegated to
98. Id. at 910.
99. 541 So. 2d 332 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 336.
101. 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991).
102. Id. at 1141.
103. LA. CIV. CODE art. 488 (2018) (“Products derived from a thing as a result
of diminution of its substance belong to the owner of that thing. When they are
reclaimed by the owner, a possessor in good faith has the right to reimbursement
of his expenses. A possessor in bad faith does not have this right.”).
104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 31:166 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
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recovering costs allocable to a party who has not consented, only out of
production, if any, attributable to that non-consenting interest. If the well
is a “dry hole,” or fails to achieve “pay-out,” the operator has no personal
claim against the non-consenting party for any deficiency or unrecouped
costs. The cases are legion in support of the proposition that one who has
not consented to an operation is only responsible for its share of costs out
of production.105
G. Articles 176 and 177
Article 176 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides an exception to
the article 175 requirement that the requisite level of consent must be
obtained before E&P operations can be conducted under a co-owned
mineral servitude. That article reads:
1. Codal Articles
Art. 176. Co-owner of mineral servitude may act to prevent waste
or destruction or extinction of servitude
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may act to prevent waste or the
destruction or extinction of the servitude, but he cannot impose
upon his co-owner liability for any costs of development or
operation or other costs except out of production. He may lease or
otherwise contract regarding the full ownership of the servitude
but must act at all times in good faith and as a reasonably prudent
mineral servitude owner whose interest is not subject to coownership.106
Art. 177. Co-owner of mineral lease may not operate
independently except to prevent waste, destruction, or termination
A co-owner of the lessee’s interest in a mineral lease may not
independently conduct operations or, except as provided in this
article and Article 171, deal with the interest without the consent
of his co-owner. He may act to prevent waste, destruction, or
termination of the lease and to protect the interest of all, but cannot
impose upon his co-owner liability for any costs or expenses
105. See cases and codal authority contained in Ottinger, supra note 86, at
Section 3.01.
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:176; see also SINGLETARY, MINERAL LAW
TREATISE, supra note 61, § 1211.
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except out of production. In so acting he must act in good faith
and must deal with the interest of the remaining owner or owners
in the manner of a reasonably prudent lessee whose interest is not
subject to co-ownership.107
2. An Exception to the Required Level of Consent
The language in these two related articles—“act to prevent waste”—
refers to the possibility that drainage is occurring by reason of the presence
of a “lease basis” well on an adjacent or nearby tract of land,108 whereby a
neighbor exercises its right under the “rule of capture”109 by draining
minerals from under the servitude tract.
The Louisiana Supreme Court took up the issue of the right of a
co-owner to operate to prevent waste in United Gas Public Service Co. v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.110 In that case, the defendant acquired
a mineral lease from F.E. Gloyd and began drilling operations.
Subsequently, the plaintiff acquired a seven-fortieths interest in the same
property and filed suit to enjoin the defendant from continuing the drilling
operations. The trial court refused to issue the injunction, and the plaintiff
appealed.
On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the
Louisiana jurisprudence and civil law doctrine that, without the other
co-owner’s consent, a co-owner may “oppose any attempt by his
co-owner, or by lessee of his co-owner, to exploit the common property
for oil or gas (or other minerals), a doctrine ‘as old as the Roman Law.’”111
Thus, the Court originally held that an injunction was the proper remedy
107. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:177.
108. “The withdrawal of gas from the lands not only deteriorated them, but
was a waste of them as the term ‘waste’ was meant in the act of mortgage.” Fed.
Land Bank of New Orleans v. Mulhern, 157 So. 370, 373 (La. 1934).
109. The “rule of capture” is codified by three articles of the Louisiana Mineral
Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (“The landowner has the exclusive right
to explore and develop his property for the production of such minerals and to
reduce them to possession and ownership.”); id. § 31:8 (“A landowner . . . may
reduce to possession and ownership all of the minerals occurring naturally in a
liquid or gaseous state that can be obtained by operations on or beneath his land
even though his operations may cause their migration from beneath the land of
another.”); id. § 31:14 (“A landowner has no right against another who causes
drainage of liquid or gaseous minerals from beneath his property if the drainage
results from drilling or mining operations on other lands.”).
110. 147 So. 66 (La. 1932).
111. Id. at 67.
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in that case and that the defendant’s course of action was to institute a
partition proceeding.
On rehearing, the Court found that granting an injunction might cause
irreparable damage to the defendant and, at the same time, prevent the use
of the property for gas-drilling operations. The Court distinguished this
case from the important case of Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v.
Carroll112 by stating that it was not shown “that the land involved was
proven oil or gas land nor that it was being drained and destroyed by
adjacent wells,” and, further, that “the titles of the landowners” were
disputed.113 The Court observed that, as a co-owner, the plaintiff would
not be damaged by defendant’s drilling operations if the defendant did not
find gas. On the other hand, if the defendant did find gas, the plaintiff
would be compensated financially for the value of the gas. Consequently,
the Court held that a co-owner could not prevent drilling operations on the
property owned in indivision and refused to issue the injunction. The
co-owner could recover any damages from the drilling operations by
receiving his share of the revenues from gas produced on the property.
The language in article 176—“destruction or extinction of the
servitude”—alludes to the potential loss of the mineral servitude by the
accrual of the prescription of nonuse.114 What is not clear is how a court
would view the earliest date prior to the accrual of prescription that would,
in the absence of operations, give rise to the possible “destruction or
extinction of the servitude” such that a co-owner of the servitude may take
action to preserve the servitude under authority of article 176. A lessee
under a mineral lease granted pursuant to this article would be vitally
interested in knowing that the lease has not been granted too soon by a
co-owner lacking the requisite level of consent, as the validity of such a
lease is tethered to a showing that it is granted to avoid “the destruction or
extinction of the servitude.”
Although article 176 does not explicitly so state, these exceptions are
seemingly only necessary in the absence of compulsory unitization
affecting or including the servitude tract or a portion thereof. To the extent
that a compulsory unit includes all or a portion of the servitude tract, there
is no “waste” because there is no drainage of the servitude as such tract
would participate in unit production.115 By the same token, unit operations
112. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La. 1919).
113. United Gas, 147 So. at 69.
114. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by . . . prescription resulting from
nonuse for ten years.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1). See OTTINGER, MINERAL
LAW TREATISE, supra note 14, § 408.
115. “A drilling unit, as contemplated herein, means the maximum area which
may be efficiently and economically drained by one well. This unit shall constitute

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 323

10/12/20 7:08 AM

1312

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

or production would maintain the mineral servitude in force and effect to
the extent that the servitude tract is in the unit.116
In those instances when the law dispenses with the need to obtain the
requisite level of consent to conduct operations in order prevent “waste”
or to avoid the “destruction or extinction of the servitude,” the co-owner
desiring to operate has the power to bind the non-acting co-owners to a
mineral lease that the acting party chooses to grant, and such lease would
validly cover “the full ownership of the servitude.”117 The instruction that
the co-owner desiring to operate “must act at all times in good faith and as
a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner whose interest is not subject
to co-ownership” is concordant with the similar principle as in a mineral
lease granted by the owner of an executive interest.118
Although the Louisiana Mineral Code fails to explain the rights of a
non-acting co-owner who is dissatisfied with the lease’s terms, a court
would apply by analogy the standards of articles 109 and 110119 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code as the most logical controlling principles. The
rule announced by the latter article is of great importance—and significant
comfort—to the lessee who is willing to incur the significant costs to drill
the well. A violation of the standard of conduct, while giving rise to a
a developed area as long as a well is located thereon which is capable of producing
oil or gas in paying quantities.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(B) (2007).
116. “It is now well established in the jurisprudence of this court that where
there is a forced unitization, on order of the Commissioner of Conservation,
commercial production from any part of the unit interrupts the running of
prescription as to all mineral servitudes within the unit.” White v. Frank B. Treat
& Son Inc., 89 So. 2d 883, 884 (La. 1956); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:37
(2000) (Supp. 2019) (“Production from a conventional or compulsory unit
embracing all or part of the tract burdened by a mineral servitude interrupts
prescription, but if the unit well is on land other than that burdened by the
servitude, the interruption extends only to that portion of the servitude tract
included in the unit.”).
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:176.
118. “The owner of an executive interest is not obligated to grant a mineral
lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith and in the same manner as a
reasonably prudent landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest is not
burdened by a nonexecutive interest.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109; see also
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 7-11.
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:110 (“A mineral lease granted in violation of
the standard of conduct required by Article 109 is not invalid for that reason, but
the owner of a nonexecutive interest may recover any damages sustained by him
by a personal action against the owner of the executive right. The action prescribes
one year from the date on which the lease is filed for registry.”); see also
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 7-12.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 324

10/12/20 7:08 AM

2020]

PERMISSION GRANTED

1313

personal action by the non-consenting co-owner against the acting
co-owner, would not invalidate the mineral lease.
Also unanswered by article 176 is the treatment to be given to a
mineral lease granted to a different lessee by one or more co-owners after
another co-owner has granted a mineral lease to another lessee pursuant to
this article, which purports to cover and affect “the full ownership of the
servitude.” Does the “first come, first served” rule operate to deny legal
efficacy to that second lease? Does that subsequent lease essentially
become a “top lease”120 with regard to the mineral lease granted pursuant
to article 176, at least with respect to the interest of the lessor signatory to
such subsequent lease?
Although not explicitly so stated, the placement of this limited
exception immediately following article 175—coupled with the fact that
logic would not compel a different conclusion—indicates that the limited
exception is not available to one whose servitude is addressed by
article 164.
The mineral servitude, which is treated by article 175 because it is a
discrete co-owned mineral servitude, might also be subject to article 164
if all co-owners of the land did not create it in the first instance.
Consequently, if a co-owner of the land created the mineral servitude in
question, article 164 necessarily applies and requires the “consent of
co-owners owning at least an undivided seventy-five percent interest in
the land” so that operations might be conducted on the land.
Even having obtained the “consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided seventy-five percent interest in the land,” if that discrete mineral
servitude is itself co-owned, or owned in indivision, article 175 also
applies and requires the “consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided seventy-five percent interest in the servitude” so that operations
might be conducted on the land.121 Thus, under these unique
circumstances, two levels of consent must be obtained from two different
categories of persons in order to operate on a co-owned servitude obtained
from a co-owner of land.
John M. McCollam, a respected commentator, explained the import of
Mineral Code article 177, noting:
[U]nder Article 177 of the new code a co-owner of the lessee’s
interest in a mineral lease may not independently conduct
operations on the leases (sic) premises without the consent of his
120. A “top lease” is a mineral lease that takes effect upon the expiration of an
existing lease. See Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So. 2d 763, 766 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1979); OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 6-02.
121. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, Section VI.D at 769.
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co-owners unless such action is necessary to prevent waste,
destruction or termination of the lease. This is the same rule which
is applicable to co-owners of land. Under this article if a co-owner
elects to act to preserve the lease or prevent waste or destruction
he must do so at his own risk and expense and cannot recover his
co-owner’s share of such cost except out of production. The
standard for determining when this independent right to act may
become operative is that discussed and applied in United Gas
Public Service Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipeline Co.122
Concerning the United Gas case previously discussed and cited in the
above passage, commentators have cautioned that the “case should not be
viewed as undercutting the validity of the rule that unanimous consent is
required for mineral development (now [75%, at that time 80%] consent
under the Mineral Code),” noting that the Supreme Court “placed great
emphasis on the particular factual circumstances of the case, stressing that
the property had no real value for farming purposes, had considerable
value for mineral purposes, and was in the process of being drained by the
plaintiff from his adjoining lands.”123
An understanding of article 177 begins with the previously noted
observation that, unless modified by agreement, the administration and
management of a thing owned in indivision requires the concurrence of all
co-owners.124 These general principles are applicable unless modified by
agreement of the co-owners. As is customary, co-owners of mineral leases
often enter into an “operating agreement” that provides for the exploration,
development, operation, or production of jointly owned mineral leases.
The notion that, in the absence of a contrary agreement, unanimity among
all co-owners of a mineral lease is required before operations may be
conducted is reinforced when one contrasts article 177 with article 175 of
the Louisiana Mineral Code, which, as noted above, allows a co-owner of
a mineral servitude to operate if it has obtained the consent of not less than
75% of the co-owners of such servitude.125
As will be seen, the “agreement of all the co-owners” is typically
granted and manifested by an operating agreement. By definition, an
operating agreement typically exists, if at all, only in the circumstances
122. See John M. McCollam, Impact of Louisiana Mineral Code on Oil, Gas
and Mineral Leases, 22 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 37, 104 (1975).
123. Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of CoOwnership: A Kommentar, 68 TUL. L. REV. 69, 129 n.320 (1993).
124. “The use and management of the thing held in indivision is determined
by agreement of all the co-owners.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 (2018).
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
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where two or more persons or companies own one or more mineral leases
in indivision.126 Conversely, there is obviously no need for an operating
agreement to exist if a mineral lease is owned by one single person or
company. One might best appreciate the import of an operating agreement
if one understands what rules apply if no operating agreement exists
among co-owners of a mineral lease.127 In particular:
Typically the [operating] agreement provides for the development
of the premises by one of the parties for the joint account. The
parties to the agreement share in the expenses of the operations
and in the proceeds of development, but the agreement normally
is not intended to affect the ownership of the minerals or the rights
to produce, in which respects, among others, the joint operating
agreement is to be distinguished from a unitization agreement and
from a mining partnership.128
As characterized by a Texas court,129 the operating agreement is not
“an ordinary contract”; instead, the court described the operating
agreement as follows:
Joint Operating Agreements, standardized forms developed over
years by the industry to govern ventures in the development of oil
and gas properties, are simply not everyday fixtures of life. They
govern operations involving immense financial risk and reward;
the parties to J.O.A. are experienced and sophisticated and
126. It should be noted that an operating agreement might also exist where
parties enter into a contract for the joint operation of separately or distinctly
owned mineral leases.
127. The American Association of Professional Landmen (AAPL) has played
an integral role in the development and refinement of operating agreements
through the publication and promotion of its Model Form. The most widely used
form of operating agreement is the AAPL Form 610—Model Form Operating
Agreement published by the AAPL. First introduced in 1956 at its Annual
Meeting in Denver, Colorado, revised forms were issued by the AAPL in 1977,
1982, 1989, and 2015.
128. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS:
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (17th ed. 2018). As stated by other respected
commentators, an operating agreement is a contract typical to the oil and gas
industry whose function is to designate an “operator, describe the scope of the
operator’s authority, provide for the allocation of costs and production among the
parties to the agreement, and provide for recourse among the parties if one or more
default in their obligations.” 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.3, at 17–7 (2d ed. 2006).
129. Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W. 2d 89, 112 (Tex. App. 1997).
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generally have balanced bargaining positions. These are
agreements which involve liabilities and obligations unique to the
legal and technical peculiarities of the oil and gas industry.130
Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court described an operating agreement—
often called a joint operating agreement or “JOA”—as “a contractual
agreement between interested parties for the operation of a tract or
leasehold for oil, gas, and other minerals.”131 The customary form of
operating agreement contains myriad provisions that regulate an array of
activities that arise in reference to joint operations. The principal clause
that would pertain to the consent requirement of article 177 would be the
“Subsequent Operations Clause.”132
Although an operating agreement is the most common means of
regulating or securing consent among co-owners of mineral leases, the
execution of an operating agreement is not required. Consent can be found
in other ways than through the execution of an operating agreement. For
example, in Double-Eight Oil and Gas L.L.C. v. Caruthers Producing Co.,
Inc.,133 a non-operator contested the right of the operator to bill it “for
expenses arising from the squeezes (sic) and related operations which were
incurred while CPC was the operator of the wells.”134
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal disagreed with the
contention of the non-operator, concluding that the trial court was not in
error in finding that the non-operator had consented to the operation as
anticipated by article 177 of the Mineral Code. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeal noted that “there is no requirement that co-owners of a mineral
lease have a written operating agreement, and the parties “conducted
business verbally.”135 The court concluded: “In order to impose
preproduction liability on a co-owner, the operator must have the consent
of the lease co-owners to the operations. There was evidence, deemed
credible by the trier of fact, that the plaintiffs were aware of and consented
to CPC’s activities.”136
130. Id.
131. Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 112 So. 3d 187, 190 (La.
2013). In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented certain amici
curiae in this suit.
132. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You Ask For: Subsequent
Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement, 63 ANN. INST. ON OIL
& GAS L. 281 (2012).
133. 942 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 1285.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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H. Article 165
As noted above in the commentary pertinent to article 85(5) of the
Mineral Code,137 a mineral royalty is a passive right that entitles its owner
to share in production brought about by the actions of another. Because of
its inferior nature, the right merely represents an entitlement to a share of
production, and a co-owner of land does not need the consent of another
co-owner to create a mineral royalty, as indicated by article 165:
Art. 165. Creation of mineral royalty by co-owner of land
A co-owner of land may create a mineral royalty out of his
undivided interest in the land, and the prescription of nonuse
commences from the date of its creation. The consent of the coowner of the party creating the royalty right is not necessary to
entitle the royalty owner to receive his proportionate part of
production.138
The comment to this article explains its raison d’être, particularly as
it pertains to the dispensation with any requirement of consent to the
creation by a co-owner of land of a mineral royalty affecting only that
co-owner’s interest in the land. The comment reads, as follows:
Article 165 is contrary to that applicable to mineral servitudes
under Article 164 in that a co-owner of land, though he may
validly create a mineral servitude in proportion to his ownership
rights in the land, cannot confer upon the grantee of such a mineral
servitude the power to exercise his right except by consent of the
other co-owners of the land subject to the servitude. The rationale
for that rule is, of course, that a new utilization of land which is
the subject of co-ownership requires the consent of the co-owners,
and no single co-owner can confer the right to utilize the land
without the consent of his co-owner or co-owners unless it be for
the purpose of preventing waste or destruction of the co-owned
property. However, since the creation of a mineral royalty does
not confer an active use right in the same sense that a mineral
servitude confers such rights, there is no reason to require the
consent of co-owners to the creation of such an interest or to the
participation by the owner of such an interest in production.
Permitting such sales and actual participation in production
137. See Section I.B.
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:165 (2000) (Supp. 2019).
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without the consent of all co-owners does no violence to the basic
rule requiring unanimous consent; for there to be production there
will have had to be consent to the exercise of a servitude or the
granting of a lease.139
It is cogent that the consent of other co-owners is unnecessary because the
creation of a mineral royalty does nothing other than constitute an
alienation or fractionalization of the right of the granting party to share in
production. Self-evidently, no harm comes to other co-owners by the
creation by one co-owner of the passive right of royalty.
I. Article 170140
“The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease,”141 and, as
such, they “are susceptible of ownership in indivision.”142 Typically, in the
absence of contract, a co-owner of a thing held in indivision must obtain
consent from its other co-owners to take certain actions.143 No consent is
needed, however, in the case where a co-owner of a mineral servitude
deems it appropriate to create a mineral royalty burdening only its interest.
The Mineral Code establishes this principle in article 170, which provides:
Art. 170. Right of co-owner of mineral servitude to create mineral
royalties
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may create a mineral royalty
out of his undivided interest in the servitude and prescription of
nonuse commences from the date of its creation. The consent of
the co-owner of the party creating the royalty is not necessary to
entitle the royalty owner to receive his proportionate part of
production.144
For the same reasons that allow a co-owner of land to create a mineral
139. Id., cmt.
140. See SINGLETARY, MINERAL LAW TREATISE, supra note 61, § 1207.
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16.
142. Id. § 31:168.
143. “The use and management of the thing held in indivision is determined
by agreement of all the co-owners.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 (2018).
144. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:170. This is consistent with article 805 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which recognizes that a “co-owner may freely lease,
alienate, or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision.”
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royalty out of its individual interest,145 without the need to secure the
consent of its co-owners, the co-owner of a mineral servitude has the
same prerogative, unburdened with any need to obtain consent from
other co-owners of the servitude.146 Thus, the comment to article 170
notes:
The right of the owner of a mineral servitude to create a mineral
royalty is recognized by Article 82. The rationale for permitting
the co-owner of a mineral servitude to create a royalty is similar
though not identical to that for permitting co-owners of land to
create royalties. . . . In the case of mineral servitudes subject to coownership, however, there is additional reason to permit creation
of royalties. Co-owners of mineral servitudes are given
independent rights of operation under Article 175. Thus,
unanimous consent to utilize the servitude is not required as in the
case of consent by co-owners of land to the exercise of a servitude
or mineral lease. . . . In light of this fact, there is all the more reason
to permit the co-owner of a mineral servitude to convey a passive
right to share in production.147
Because a mineral royalty is simply an alienation or redistribution of a
portion of the revenue to which the creator is entitled, it is of no concern
to another co-owner that its co-proprietor chooses to diminish its right to
all of the revenue to which it is entitled.
J. Article 171148
Concordant with the situation in which a co-owner of land or of a
mineral servitude creates a mineral royalty interest, the co-owner of the
working interest in a mineral lease can allocate to another person a portion
of its revenue entitlement by creating certain “dependent rights,” such as
an overriding royalty interest. Thus, article 171 states:
Art. 171. Right of co-owner of mineral lease to create dependent
rights

145. See Section I.G.
146. See discussion of article 165, supra Section I.H.
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:170 cmt.
148. Portions of the commentary on article 171 represent an adaptation of
materials contained in OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1010; see also SINGLETARY, MINERAL LAW TREATISE, supra note 61, § 1207.
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A co-owner of the lessee’s interest in a mineral lease may create
a dependent right such as an overriding royalty, production
payment, net profits interest, or other non-operating interest out of
his undivided interest without the consent of his co-owner. He
may also transfer all or part of his undivided interest.149
The most prevalent form of a “dependent right” is the overriding royalty
interest. The overriding royalty interest entitles its owner to participate in
production from or attributable to a mineral lease without the associated
payment of costs or expenses.150 In the industry, an overriding royalty
interest is called an “override” or an “ORRI.”151 The Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal has stated that: “An overriding royalty under an
oil and gas lease is an incorporeal immovable.”152
The comment to article 171 expounds on the import of the article:
Article 171 permits a co-owner of a mineral lease to create
nonoperating interests such as those listed to the extent of his
ownership in the lease without the consent of the remaining coowner or co-owners. In so doing, it reflects the accepted industry
practice. Nonoperating interests of this kind are passive income
interests, and allowing their creation does not conflict with the
principle stated in Article 177, which prohibits one co-owner of a
lease from operating without consent of the other. The thrust of
Article 177 is that management decisions concerning operations
must be made by all of the co-owners. However, insofar as one
co-owner has a right to share in production, there is no reason why
he should be prohibited from dealing with the income stream from
his undivided interest as he sees fit. It is true that an argument
might be made that permitting a co-owner to alienate portions of
the income stream flowing from the lease, even though limited to
his own fractional interest, permits him to lessen the value of the
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:171. This is consistent with article 805 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which recognizes that a “co-owner may freely lease,
alienate, or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision.”
150. Although an overriding royalty interest is immune from responsibility for
drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and operating expenses, it would be liable
for “post-production costs” unless excused by contract. See Patrick S. Ottinger, A
Funny Thing Happened at the Wellhead: “Post-production Costs” and
Responsibility Therefor, 8 LSU J. ENERGY LAW & RESOURCES 1 (2019), Section
III.A.1 at 32–33.
151. For a comprehensive examination of the ORRI, see Randall S. Davidson,
The Overriding Royalty, 27 ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 38 (1980).
152. Porter v. Johnson, 408 So. 2d 961, 965 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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co-owned property. However, there has never been any question
of this nature raised by those commonly dealing with mineral
leases, and it is clear that to prohibit continuation of this custom
of dealing would have caused great difficulty.
Insofar as Article 171 permits transfers of all or part of a coowner’s undivided interest, it also reflects established law and
practice. See Article 127.
Insofar as royalties are concerned, there are no management or use
problems among co-owners of a royalty. In final form the owner
of a royalty shares in the income stream from gross production.
Partition in effect results from sharing of income among coowners of the right. If further division is desired, the co-owner of
a royalty may dispose of all or any portion of his interest freely
and without consent of his co-owners.153
Article 171 affirms the proposition that, by reason of its passive nature,
and in view of the fact that it merely represents a right to share in
production, a mineral royalty may be established by the “co-owner of the
lessee’s interest in a mineral lease,” and the creation of such mineral right,
burdening the distinct interest of a co-owner, causes no harm whatsoever
to the owner of other interests in the mineral lease.
K. Article 190(B)154
The next circumstance in which the consent of another is contemplated
is in the important article on usufruct of land. Article 190(B) of the Mineral
Code reads, as follows:
Art. 190. Usufructuary of land entitled to enjoyment of mines or
quarries worked; exception
***

153. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:171 cmt.
154. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9-08; see also
M. HAMPTON CARVER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE, Chapter 13, Rights
of Usufructuaries and Naked Owners in the Production of Oil, Gas and Other
Minerals § 1311 (Martin, ed., Claitor’s Law Books & Publishing Division, Inc.
2012) [hereinafter CARVER, MINERAL LAW TREATISE].
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B. If a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse, whether legal
or conventional, and there is no contrary provision in the
instrument creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to the
use and enjoyment of the landowner’s rights in minerals, whether
or not mines or quarries were actually worked at the time the
usufruct was created. However, the rights to which the
usufructuary is thus entitled shall not include the right to execute
a mineral lease without the consent of the naked owner.155
Mainly, article 190 represents a legislative expansion of the rights of the
surviving spouse usufruct156 so as to ensure that a surviving spouse has
sufficient sustenance by always receiving the use and enjoyment of the
landowner’s rights in minerals.157 Pertinent for our purposes is paragraph
B of this article.
The last sentence of article 190(B) is arguably susceptible of differing
interpretations. It is not clear whether it means that, if the lessee secures a
mineral lease from the usufructuary of the type envisioned by that
paragraph and from all of the naked owners, the lessee holds a valid
mineral lease and is permitted to operate. On the other hand, in stating that
“the rights to which the usufructuary is thus entitled shall not include the
right to execute a mineral lease without the consent of the naked owner,”
it might be argued that the lessee cannot even seek to secure a mineral
lease from the usufructuary unless it first secures the consent of the naked
owners. In other words, one might contend that this language means that
the naked owners are “keepers of the gate” through which the lessee must
travel before attempting to secure a mineral lease from the usufructuary.
If the latter interpretation were valid, assume that the lessee acquires
a mineral lease from the usufructuary and drills a well that produces for
four years, during which time the lessee pays the usufructuary the onefifth royalty stipulated in her mineral lease. Thereafter, the usufructuary
dies. Then, the former naked owners—who are now full owners, the

155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190.
156. “If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, the surviving spouse
shall have a usufruct over the decedent’s share of the community property to the
extent that the decedent has not disposed of it by testament. This usufruct
terminates when the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever occurs first.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 890 (2018).
157. “This deviation from traditional principles is justified in light of the
solicitude for the interests of the surviving spouse.” 3 A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS,
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 2:21 (5th ed. 2011).
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usufruct having been terminated by the death of the usufructuary158—
notify the lessee that it owes them the entirety of all production after “payout” because the mineral lease from the former usufructuary was not valid
because it had been granted “without the consent [permission] of the naked
owner.”159
To remove these issues, the lessee should cause the mineral lease to
be executed jointly by the usufructuary and all of the naked owners, with
an express statement on the part of the naked owners that they join for all
purposes, including so as to consent to the granting of the lease by the
usufructuary.
L. Article 195160
The Louisiana Mineral Code applies to both migratory or fugacious
minerals as well as solid minerals.161 Of interest to the person who mines
for coal or lignite is the second sentence of Mineral Code article 195,
which contains a consent requirement that is appropriate in view of the
detrimental nature of those types of activities.
Art. 195. Right of naked owner of land to enjoyment of minerals
If a usufruct of land does not include mineral rights, the naked
owner of the land has all of the rights in minerals that he would
have if the land were not subject to the usufruct. The rights may
not be exercised in coal or lignite which is to be produced through
surface mining techniques without first obtaining the consent of
the usufructuary. If the usufructuary is entitled to the benefits
provided in Article 190 and 191, the rights of the landowner are
subject thereto.162
Indicatively, the consent of the usufructuary is not required for the conduct
of more traditional oil and gas E&P activities that, in contrast to mining
operations, are more geographically restricted and can be less invasive, but

158. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 607 (“The right of usufruct expires upon the death
of the usufructuary.”).
159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:190.
160. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 9-13; see also
CARVER, MINERAL LAW TREATISE, supra note 154, § 1312.
161. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:5, 31:6.
162. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:195.
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consent is necessary for the exploitation of coal and lignite, which is more
destructive to the surface of the land because it involves “strip mining.”163
II. THE FORM OF CONSENT AND THE STANDARDS FOR GRANTING OR
WITHHOLDING IT
Having examined in detail the several articles of the Mineral Code that
contain a reference to the need to obtain consent or that dispense with the
necessity to attain such approval, it is appropriate to consider the issue of
whether such consent must be in a certain form, as well as the standards
for granting or obtaining consent, where consent is required.
A. Meaning of Consent
Despite the several references, the Mineral Code does not define
“consent.” As the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that in “determining
the ‘common and approved usage’” of an undefined word, “[d]ictionaries
are a valuable source.”164
One dictionary defines consent as “to express a willingness,” “give
assent or approval,” “compliance or approval . . . of what is done or
proposed by another,” or “capable, deliberate, and voluntary agreement to
or concurrence in some act or purpose implying physical and mental power
and free action.”165 Black’s Law Dictionary, the leading law dictionary,
offers, as a meaning, a “voluntary yielding to what another proposes or
desires.”166
Although the meaning of consent is perhaps well understood in
common vernacular—particularly when aided by the definitions provided
in respected dictionaries—it is also akin to the use of the word in the
formation of a contract, often stated as “uniting of the will of all of these
defendants on the same points, such as is essential in the formation of a
valid contract.”167

163. “This process of extraction, called strip mining, completely eliminates the
surface owner’s enjoyment of the portion of the property being mined.” River
Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Res. of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878, 880 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ refused, 337 So. 2d 221 (La. 1976).
164. Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Ins. Co., 851 So. 2d 959, 964 (La. 2003).
165. Consent, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).
166. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
167. Placid Oil Co. v. George, 59 So. 2d 120, 125 (La. 1952).
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B. Implications of Public Policy as a Limitation on Rights of Contracting
Parties
Although “freedom of contract” is available to the parties to a
transaction involving mineral rights,168 in the absence of any contractual
intervention to the contrary, the above codal statements involving
“consent” must be abided or considered.169 The Louisiana Mineral Code
robustly invokes the principle of “freedom of contract,” allowing
contracting parties to renounce or modify provisions of the Code, provided
that “the renunciation or modification does not affect the rights of others
and is not contrary to the public good.”170 Consideration must be given to
the extent to which an affirmative requirement for consent represents a
matter of public policy that may not be modified by a private contract.
The methodology that a court will engage to ascertain whether a
contractual provision violates public policy or “affect[s] the rights of
others” was explained in Matter of Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co., Ltd.171 In
that case, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an
argument that a contractual provision in a mortgage that altered the
requirements or directive of law was unenforceable as being violative of
public policy. The court did not accede to that argument, explaining, as
follows:
The task of distinguishing between suppletive and imperative laws
is best approached, not in an abstract inquiry into the character of
a particular provision in light of the elusive concepts of public
order or the public interest, but . . . by examining “the particular
clause of the agreement which does away with a rule of law,
and . . . ask[ing] whether the enforcement of the clause would be
against public policy.” 172

168. The important principle of “freedom of contract” is addressed in Part I of
Chapter Two of OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1.
169. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (2000) (Supp. 2019) (“Unless expressly
or impliedly prohibited from doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what
is established in their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or
modification does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary to the public
good.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 7 (2018) (“Persons may not by their juridical
acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest. Any act
in derogation of such laws is an absolute nullity.”).
170. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3.
171. 117 F.3d 160, 173 (5th Cir. 1997).
172. Id. at 174.
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Self-evidently, where a codal provision requires the consent of a certain
third person, contracting parties may not dispense with the necessity to
secure that consent without the concurrence of the party in whose favor
the consent requirement inures. To obtain the consent of the relevant
person is tantamount to seeking dispensation from such person.
In those instances where the text of the Code contemplates the interest
of a third person, deemed by policy to be worthy of protection via a
mechanism of consent, such person is somewhat analogous to a third party
beneficiary in the realm of private contracts.173 Indeed, just as in the latter
context, the legitimate interests of the third person are protected by the
notion of consent.
C. Form of Consent
With one exception, in the several instances where the consent of some
other person is required, no modifier stipulates that consent must be in
writing or be manifested in any other formality. The exception is Mineral
Code article 85(5), which alludes to the royalty owner who “consents
expressly and in writing to become bound by” a certain act of a servitude
owner.174
Although not controlling, article 1927 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides the following direction on the manner in which consent might be
given in the particular context of offer and acceptance that is necessary for
the formation of a contract. It provides, in pertinent part:
Art. 1927. Consent
A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established
through offer and acceptance.
Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended
contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or
by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly
indicative of consent.175
Professor Litvinoff offered the following commentary on the form of
consent and how it might be found to exist, in the following words:
No particular form is required for the offer or the acceptance.
173. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1978–82.
174. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:85(5).
175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
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Either of them, the offer, as well as the acceptance of a contract,
may be express, implied or tacit: express when evinced by words,
either written or spoken; implied when manifested by actions; tacit
when evidenced by silence or inaction, or when the circumstances
of a particular situation, or a legal presumption directs the
consideration of actions, silence, or inaction as evidence of
consent.176
Express consent is permission stated in explicit written terms. Implied
consent has been found to exist based upon the knowledge and actions of
an actor. For example, in Connette v. Wright,177 a co-owner of mineral
leases was held responsible for his share of drilling costs and supervision
because “execution of the division orders and the receipt of his share of
the proceeds of all of the oil produced and sold was a complete ratification
by defendant of the drilling operations conducted by plaintiff on the whole
property.”178 This case illustrates the codal notion that a “contract is
formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and
acceptance” and that, in most cases, “offer and acceptance may be made
orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is
clearly indicative of consent.”179
Tacit consent of a party arises from its silence in the face of certain
facts.180 Although it did not involve a co-owned mineral lease in the
absence of a contract, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Caddo
Oil Co., Inc. v. O’Brien rejected arguments that a non-operating party
under an operating agreement had impliedly or tacitly consented to certain
operations.181 The circumstances at issue were considered by the court,
which concluded that, lacking either implied or tacit consent, the operator
“cannot force [the non-operator] to invest in wells in which he does not
wish to invest and to the drilling of which he did not consent.”182
Hence, lacking any other direction in the text of the Mineral Code, a
court should apply the instruction of the second paragraph of article 1927
176. Saúl Litvinoff, Offer and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative
Analysis: Part I – Offer, 28 LA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1967).
177. 98 So. 674 (La. 1924).
178. Id. at 676.
179. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
180. “[B]y his continued silence and failure to protest or object to its inclusion
in the dray receipt, it tacitly consented thereto and cannot now be heard to
repudiate its legal effect.” S. States Equip. Co. v. Jack Legett Co., 379 So. 2d 881,
884 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 381 So. 2d 1232 (La. 1980).
181. Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v. O’Brien, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
182. Id. at 16.
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and permit the consent under the relevant articles of the Mineral Code to
be manifested or “made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that
under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.”
Although oral, implicit, or tacit consent is sufficient, the party who
takes action in reliance on the consent of another party would be prudent
to obtain such permission in writing, even in a simple letter format. A
written document evidencing the necessary consent might serve the
purpose of proof if the party whose consent is required is unavailable or
“changes her mind” at a later date.
D. Filing of Consent for Recordation
Even if obtained in writing, this manifestation of consent is not
required to be filed for recordation in the conveyance records. Such
consent would be effective as to third persons even if not evidenced of
record in accordance with article 3339 of the Civil Code, which articulates
certain matters that need not be placed of record in order to be effective
against third parties.
The notion of “consent,” when required by the text of a relevant article
of the Mineral Code, would constitute either “a matter of . . . authority” in
the sense of permission, or “a similar matter pertaining to rights and
obligations evidenced by a recorded instrument” for purposes of this
article.183 Consequently, the writing that evidences such consent need not
be recorded and would be “effective as to a third person although not
evidenced of record.”184
Nevertheless, although not required to be filed of record, a writing that
is recorded in the conveyance records will never be lost—by a weather
event, office move, or fire—if ever needed at a later date when the party
whose consent is required might assert the absence of consent.
E. Temporal Feature of Granting or Obtaining Consent
None of the Mineral Code articles that require the obtention of consent
offer any controlling direction or limitation as to when that consent must
be obtained. Therefore, the consent can be obtained at or contemporaneous
with the event to be undertaken, or it can be secured at an earlier date, well
prior to the future event that requires consent. Although obtaining consent
at an earlier date certainly avoids conflict at the later date when the consent
is needed, any such early consent should be obtained without limitation
because any change in circumstance might afford an argument to be made
183. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3339.
184. Id. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, § 1-13.
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that “things have changed,” such that the gratuitous consent is no longer
valid.
In view of the several articles of the Mineral Code that impose—or
dispense with—a requirement of obtaining consent, it is important to
understand the rules that regulate consent insofar as the meaning of
“consent” and the form in which consent must be manifested when
required. The authorities noted in Part II give context and insight to these
important principles.
CONCLUSION
Article 1985 of the Louisiana Civil Code informs: “Contracts may
produce effects for third parties only when provided by law.”185 Mindful
of this admonition, the Redactors of the Mineral Code were thoughtful in
the formulation of its articles that presented implications for parties other
than two contracting persons. The mechanism employed by the Redactors
when there was a need to be mindful of the effect of a contract on a third
person was the notion of consent—sometimes required, other times
obviated.
Since only 14 of 226 articles of the Code make any reference to
consent, the general absence in the Mineral Code of any overarching
requirement that a party must first obtain the consent of another party
before taking action says a great deal about the latitude given to a party
dealing with land or mineral rights. In those instances where the Mineral
Code does contain a feature of consent, public policy recognizes that the
rights of third persons are important and should be respected.
Except in one instance, the form in which consent, where required,
must be obtained is not statutorily mandated, meaning that parties must go
to other laws to discern how consent might be manifested.
Notwithstanding the general omission of the matter of form, prudence
suggests that the consent, when required, should be in writing and possibly
filed of record—not because it needs to be recorded, but to ensure that, at
later date when issues arise, it is locatable. 186
185. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985.
186. There is yet another significant benefit to obtaining written consent and
placing it of record, even though not required. If consent has been obtained and
if, at a later date, the lessee seeks to sell its interest in the relevant lease, the
purchaser, in the performance of due diligence, would presumably ask to see
evidence of the consent where required by the Code. If it is not contained in the
seller’s records, or is lost, difficulties might be presented in the consummation of
the transaction. But if it is obtained and placed of record, that concern would not
be presented. The important topic of due diligence in connection with the purchase
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The redactors of the Mineral Code are to be commended for including
the notion of consent in the several contexts that are addressed by the
articles in which that requirement appears. The inclusion—or
dispensation—of the requirement of consent represents a thoughtful
balance of interest between the party who might desire to take a certain
action and the third person whose interest would be implicated without the
notion of concurrence.
The policy considerations that underpin the need for consent in a
particular context are valid and appropriate, and this Article has as its
principal goal the attainment of a better understanding of the rationale for
the obtaining of consent as a mechanism to protect and foster the interests
of all parties involved in the matter.

and sale of producing oil and gas properties is examined in Patrick S. Ottinger,
Closing the Deal in the Bayou State: The Purchase and Sale of Producing Oil and
Gas Properties, 76 LA. L. REV. 691 (2016).
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